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ABSTRACT
Because of the negative effects domestic violence has on a child’s
development, many states, including Alaska, have adopted a rebuttable
presumption that awarding custody to a parent who has committed domestic
violence is not in the child’s best interests. Once the presumption is triggered,
the parent who perpetrated domestic violence cannot be awarded any form of
custody. To invoke the presumption, a certain level of domestic violence has to
have been committed, the victim must be a domestic living partner, and the
violence must be proved by a preponderance of the evidence. The presumption
may be rebutted by demonstrating rehabilitation, lack of substance abuse, and
that the best interests of the child require custody. The presumption is
effective because it encourages victims to leave their abusers, ensures that
courts consider domestic violence in their custody determinations, nullifies
other considerations that disfavor the abused parent, and simplifies custody
cases. The Alaska statute could be improved, however, by clarifying key
terms, allowing children to raise the presumption, and providing judges less
discretion in undoing the presumption’s effects.
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INTRODUCTION
Changes in child custody laws are commonplace in the United
States, as legislatures continually search to serve the best interests of the
child. The high stakes and high emotions of contested custody cases
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present the greatest challenges. In these cases, the existence of domestic
violence further compounds the complexity of making a decision that
actually serves the child’s best interests. Following a litany of social
science research revealing the negative effects domestic violence may
have on a child’s development, states began strengthening the language
in their child custody statutes to ensure that the existence of domestic
violence is appropriately considered in custody decisions. One approach
has been to create a rebuttable presumption that awarding custody to a
parent who has perpetrated a certain level of domestic violence is not in
a child’s best interests. Alaska adopted such a presumption in 2004.
This Note will explain and critique Alaska’s presumption and its
possible effects on child custody decisions. Part I of this Note explains
the theory behind two custody presumptions. Part II explores the
historical context of rebuttable presumptions. Part III explains the
operation of the Alaska rebuttable presumption: its effect on custody
decisions, how it may be invoked, and when it may be rebutted. Finally,
Parts IV and V explore the strengths and weaknesses of the statute and
argue that while the presumption may ultimately protect victims of
domestic violence, either the courts or the legislature must further define
key terms of the statute. Throughout this Note, frequent comparisons
with custody laws in other states will help highlight the strengths,
weaknesses, and underlying policy of the Alaska rebuttable
presumption and will provide the basis for interpreting and critiquing
the Alaska law.

I. THE RELEVANCE OF DOMESTIC VIOLENCE IN DETERMINING
CHILD CUSTODY
A. Presumption of Joint Custody
Courts attempt to serve the child’s best interests when making
custody decisions.1 Legislatures are free to enumerate factors for courts
to consider when deciding what arrangements will be most beneficial to
a child. Although today nearly every state requires courts to consider
evidence of domestic violence as relevant to custody decisions, many
legislatures also express a preference for joint physical custody.2 With

1. See 24 AM. JUR. 2D Divorce and Separation § 931 (2008) (“In divorce
proceedings, the ‘best interests’ of a child is a proper and feasible criterion for
making a decision as to which of the two parents will be accorded custody of the
child.”) (internal citations omitted).
2. See Martha Fineman, Dominant Discourse, Professional Language, and Legal
Change in Child Custody Decisionmaking, 101 HARV. L. REV. 727, 732 (“[D]ivorce is
now described as a process that, through mediation, restructures and
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the advent of no-fault divorce in the 1970s, courts shifted away from
examining the relationship between parents when making child custody
decisions and instead looked toward the future to determine their ability
to parent.3 Unless a court foresaw that a past history of abuse would
affect the child’s best interests—which it generally did not—domestic
violence was not considered in making custody decisions.4 The
preference for joint custody is rooted not only in the belief that coparenting is beneficial to a child of divorce, but also in the desire to
protect parents’ rights to maintain relationships with their children.5
First, joint physical and legal custody arrangements may be in a
child’s best interests. Studies show that children adjust better to divorce
and exhibit fewer behavioral problems when both parents share social
and financial responsibility for the child than when only one parent
bears those responsibilities.6 Social scientists also suggest educational
and social benefits: children who interact with their fathers post-divorce
have higher IQs, greater success in school, and lower drop-out and
truancy rates than children who do not.7 Further, absence of the non-

reformulates the spouses' relationship, conferring equal or shared parental rights
on both parents although one, in practice, usually assumes the primary
responsibility.”).
3. See Naomi R. Cahn, Civil Images of Battered Women: The Impact of Domestic
Violence on Child Custody Decisions, 44 VAND. L. REV. 1041, 1043 (1991) (discussing
the decline in applying fault-based divorce principles to determine custody);
DONNA S. HERSHKOWITZ & DREW R. LIEBERT, ASSEMBLY JUDICIARY COMM., DIVORCE
REFORM IN CALIFORNIA: FROM FAULT TO NO-FAULT… AND BACK AGAIN? (Cal.
1997) (describing the rise of no-fault divorce in California and the United States);
Thomas R. Trenkner, Annotation, Modern Status of Maternal Preference Rule or
Presumption in Child Custody Cases, 70 A.L.R. 3d 262 (1976) (discussing court
cases in which the court considered whether there is a preference or
presumption favoring custody with the mother).
4. See infra Part V.A.
5. Elton H. v. Naomi R., 119 P.3d 969, 977 n.31 (Alaska 2005) (“A parent
cannot be deprived of custody based solely on the best interest of the child.”)
(citing Turner v. Pannick, 540 P.2d 1051, 1054–55 (Alaska 1975)); Irwin Garfinkel
& Sarah McLanahan, The Effects of the Child Support Provisions of the Family
Support Act of 1988 on Child Well-Being, 9 POPULATION RES. & POL’Y REV. 205, 212
(1990) (reviewing the disadvantages children from single-parent families face).
6. Paul R. Amato & Joan G. Gilbreth, Nonresident Fathers and Children’s Wellbeing: A Meta-Analysis, 61 J. MARRIAGE & FAM. 557, 564 (1999) (finding that
children’s academic success was positively related to father’s payment of child
support); Judith A. Seltzer, Relationships Between Fathers and Children Who Live
Apart: The Father’s Role After Separation, 53 J. MARRIAGE & FAM. 79, 87–93 (1991)
(finding that nonresident fathers’ involvement in their children’s social life and
in making decisions about the child is positively correlated with paying child
support); Garfinkel & McLanahan, supra note 5, at 224 (finding that “[i]ncreases
in child support payments affect child well-being”).
7. See Chadwick L. Menning, Absent Parents Are More Than Money: The Joint
Effect of Activities and Financial Support on Youths’ Educational Attainment, 23 J.
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custodial parent may negatively affect the psychological and emotional
development of children.8 However, when parents are unable to
cooperate with each other after a divorce, the benefits children receive
from co-parenting may cease to exist.9
Second, joint custody protects both parents’ rights to maintain a
parental relationship with their children. In the mid-1970s, child custody
laws favored the mother: tender-years presumptions awarded custody
of young children to mothers, absent a showing that she was unfit.10
Following a vocal fathers’ rights movement, those presumptions were
abolished in favor of those providing for joint custody.11 By 1990, the
maternal preference had ceased to exist in all but five states.12

FAM. ISSUES 648, 661–63 (2002) (finding that participating in activities with a
nonresident parent increases a child’s chance of obtaining a high school diploma
and attending a post-secondary institution); Douglas B. Downey, When Bigger is
not Better: Family Size, Resources, and Children’s Educational Performance, 60 AM.
SOC. REV. 746, 756 (1995) (finding that as parents contribute fewer economic and
interpersonal resources, their children’s academic achievement declines; finding
that frequency of discussion has the biggest effect on academic performance).
8. See Andrew Schepard, Taking Children Seriously: Promoting Cooperative
Custody After Divorce, 64 TEX. L. REV. 687, 701–20 (1985) (discussing the effects of
divorce on children and the value of co-parenting).
9. See infra note 15.
10. JOHN E. B. MYERS, LEGAL ISSUES IN CHILD ABUSE AND NEGLECT PRACTICE 73
(1998); DEBORAH L. RHODE, JUSTICE AND GENDER 155 (1989); see Trenkner, supra
note 3, § 9(a); see, e.g., Wetzler v. Wetzler, 570 P.2d 741, 742 (Alaska 1977)
(“Under the ‘tender years’ doctrine, a mother will generally be given preference
for custody if the other factors are evenly balanced.”); Clark v. Bayer, 32 Ohio St.
299, 310 (Ohio 1877) (holding that where the father “is a suitable person, able
and willing to support and care for [his children], his right [to custody] is
paramount to that of all other persons, except that of the mother in cases where the
infant child is of such tender years as to require her present care . . .”) (emphasis
added); Weaver v. Weaver, 261 S.W.2d 145, 148 (Tenn. Ct. App. 1953) (“A
mother, except in extraordinary circumstances, should be with her child of
tender years. The courts have repeatedly recognized this as a primary
doctrine.”).
11. RHODE, supra note 10, at 156; see, e.g., King v. Vancil, 341 N.E.2d 65 (Ill.
App. Ct. 1975) (holding that the Illinois tender years presumption violated the
state’s equal protection clause).
12. See Stephen J. Bahr et al., Trends in Child Custody Awards: Has the Removal
of Maternal Preference Made a Difference?, 28 FAM. L.Q. 247, 249 (1994).
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When Joint Custody Is Not in the Child’s Best Interests: Evidence
of Abuse13

When domestic violence is present in a household, physical contact
with the abusive parent may not be in the best interests of the child,
even when abuse was never directed at the child.14 The presumption
that joint custody is in a child’s best interests assumes co-parenting
produces benefits that are not present when one parent acts as the sole
decision-maker. Those benefits—both those to the child and those to the
parents—are not present where the parents have been in an abusive
relationship.15 First, the possibility of future physical harm indicates that
custody with a perpetrator of domestic violence is not in a child’s best
interests. Second, ongoing contact with the abusive parent may be
13. Some argue that the benefits of co-parenting exist only in unique
families. See, e.g., Daniel G. Saunders, Child Custody and Visitation Decisions in
Domestic Violence Cases: Legal Trends, Research Findings, and Recommendations
(1998), http://new.vawnet.org/category/Main_Doc.php?docid=371
(“Enthusiasm for joint custody in the early 1980s was fueled by studies of
couples who were highly motivated to make it work.”) (internal quotation
marks omitted). Further, many surveys and studies assert that joint custody
presumptions are almost never in the child’s best interests. See, e.g., Gerald W.
Hardcastle, Joint Custody: A Family Court Judge's Perspective, 32 FAM. L.Q. 201, 207
(1998) (“The criticisms are valid. It is extremely difficult in one sense to design a
research tool sufficient to measure something as complex as ‘joint custody.’”);
Thomas J. Reidy et al., Child Custody Decisions: A Survey of Judges, 23 FAM. L.Q.
75, 80 (1989) (“The most frequently cited reasons [for failure of joint custody]
included poor cooperation (30.5 percent), instability created by shifting from
home to home (29.8 percent), distance between homes (25.5 percent), and
acrimony and revenge between the parents (19.1 percent).”); Jana B. Singer &
William L. Reynolds, A Dissent on Joint Custody, 47 MD. L. REV. 497, 507 (1988)
(“The limited number of studies relied upon by joint custody proponents have
other serious methodological shortcomings.”). Whether such statements are true
is outside the scope of this Note, though the assertion that joint custody is never
in a child’s best interests does not contradict the thesis of this Note.
14. See H.R. Con. Res. 172, 101st Cong. § 1 (1990) (“[F]or purposes of
determining child custody, credible evidence of physical abuse of a spouse
should create a statutory presumption that it is detrimental to the child to be
placed in the custody of the abusive spouse.”).
15. See Judith A. Seltzer, Relationships Between Fathers and Children Who Live
Apart: The Father's Role After Separation, 53 J. MARRIAGE & FAM. 79, 81 (1991); Paul
R. Amato, The Consequence of Divorce for Adults and Children, 62 J. MARRIAGE &
FAM. 1269, 1280 (“Interparental hostility and lack of cooperation between
parents following divorce is a consistent predictor of poor outcomes among
offspring. . . . Conflict was especially aversive if it involved physical violence or
made children feel as if they were caught in the middle.”) (internal citations
omitted); Amato & Gilbreth, supra note 6, at 564 (finding only a small correlation
between contact with a nonresident father and children’s academic success and
ability to internalize problems); Alan Booth & Paul R. Amato, Parental Predivorce
Relations and Offspring Postdivorce Well-Being, 63 J. MARRIAGE & FAM. 197, 211
(concluding that dissolution of high-conflict families benefits children).
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detrimental to the child’s development. Third, requiring hostile parents
to remain in contact can harm the parents and negate the positive effects
of co-parenting.
1. Potential Physical Harm. Custody with a perpetrator of
domestic violence is not in a child’s best interests because it is more
likely to result in physical harm to the child. Perpetrators of domestic
violence are more likely than non-perpetrators to abuse their children. A
review of more than thirty studies shows that child abuse and violence
toward another household member are linked between 30% and 60% of
the time.16 Another study suggests that the presence of domestic
violence indicates a 40% to 70% probability that the child is also being
physically abused.17
A child in a family where domestic violence is present is likely to
be physically harmed even when violence has previously been directed
only at the abuser’s partners. Physical harm to a previously unharmed
child may occur because the abused parent takes out her stress on the
child, because the abuser redirects his attention, or because the child
gets in the way of the abuse. For example, in a study of 146 children ages
eleven to seventeen from violent homes, all sons over the age of fourteen
had attempted to protect their mothers from abuse; 62% of those
children were injured in the process.18 Even if the abuser is with a new
partner, the child may not be safe from physical harm. One research
study found that 58% of male offenders perpetrated violence against
their new partners after the dissolution of a previously abusive
relationship.19
In fact, incidents of violence are likely to continue when a domestic
violence survivor leaves a partner who has been abusing her. In one
study, more than one third of battered women were re-assaulted after
they had separated from their abusive partners.20 In Canada, 39% of
abused women reported that violence began only after separation; 24%
16. JEFFREY L. EDLESON ET AL., PARENTING IN THE CONTEXT OF DOMESTIC
VIOLENCE 9 (2003), available at http://www.courtinfo.ca.gov/programs/cfcc/
pdffiles/fullReport.pdf.
17. Jeffrey L. Edleson, The Overlap Between Child Maltreatment and Woman
Battering, 5 VIOLENCE AGAINST WOMEN 134 (1999); accord DAVID ROBINSON & JOANNE TAYLOR, THE INCIDENCE OF FAMILY VIOLENCE PERPETRATED BY FEDERAL
OFFENDERS: A FILE REVIEW STUDY (Correctional Service of Canada No. FV-03,
1995) available at http://www.csc-scc.gc.ca/text/pblct/fv/fv03/toce-eng.shtml.
18. Joan Zorza, Woman Battering: A Major Cause of Homelessness, 25
CLEARINGHOUSE REV. 421, 424 (1991).
19. Sharon Woffordt et al., Continuities in Marital Violence, 9 J. FAM. VIOLENCE
195, 215 (1994).
20. Mary A. Kernic et al., Children in the Crossfire, 11 VIOLENCE AGAINST
WOMEN 991, 992 (2005) (reviewing literature on post-separation violence).
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reported that pre-existing violent behavior escalated post-separation.21 A
study of 235 Canadian women revealed that 25% were threatened by
their abuser during child visitations.22 These studies demonstrate that
putting the perpetrator and the victim in a position where they are likely
to have future contact, as when they share physical or legal custody of
their child, only heightens the risk to the victim.23 When a parent is at
risk of violence, so are those around her, including her children.
2. Detriment to Child’s Development. Merely observing domestic
violence may have the same effect on a child as actually being abused.
Children who witness domestic abuse experience increased health
problems as well as impaired behavioral and emotional functioning,
even when they are not abused themselves.24
First, children who grow up in households with domestic violence
experience short-term health problems, including asthma, insomnia, and
ulcers, at a higher rate than children who do not witness abuse.25
Second, these children are at a higher risk for mental health problems,
including depression, aggression, anxiety, and post-traumatic stress
disorder.26 Third, witnessing domestic violence may impair children’s
cognitive functioning.27 Fourth, long-term behavioral and emotional
problems, like depression in adulthood and difficulties with social
adjustment, are more common among children who witness domestic
violence.28

21. Canadian Ctr. for Justice Statistics, FAMILY VIOLENCE IN CANADA: A
STATISTICAL PROFILE 31 (2001).
22. B. LEIGHTON, SPOUSAL ABUSE IN METROPOLITAN TORONTO: RESEARCH
REPORT ON THE RESPONSE OF THE CRIMINAL JUSTICE SYSTEM (Solicitor General of
Canada No. 1989-02, 1989).
23. See Ruth E. Fleury et al., When Ending the Relationship Does Not End the
Violence: Women’s Experiences of Violence by Former Partners, 6 VIOLENCE AGAINST
WOMEN 1315, 1376 (2000) (finding that proximity to victim is a key factor in postseparation assault).
24. Jeffrey L. Edelson, Children’s Witnessing of Adult Domestic Violence, 14 J.
INTERPERSONAL VIOLENCE 839, 845 (1999) (reviewing thirty-one studies of
children who witnessed domestic violence between their parents but who were
not abused themselves).
25. Leigh Goodmark, From Property to Personhood, 102 W. VA. L. REV. 237,
246; Marjory D. Fields, The Impact of Spouse Abuse on Children and its Relevance in
Custody and Visitation Decisions in New York State, 3 CORNELL J. L. & PUB. POL’Y
221, 230 (1994).
26. Edelson, Children’s Witnessing Domestic Violence, supra note 24, at 846;
Goodmark, supra note 25, at 258; Fields, supra note 25, at 230; Alan J. Tomkins et
al., Plight of Children who Witness Woman Battering: Psychological Knowledge and
Policy Implications, 18 LAW AND PYSCHOL. REV. 137, 145–49 (1994).
27. Edelson, Children’s Witnessing Domestic Violence, supra note 24, at 860.
28. Id. at 860–61; Goodmark, supra note 25, at 250; Tomkins et al., supra note
26, at 149–52.
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Perhaps most disturbingly, children who grow up in homes where
domestic violence is present tend to imitate the violent behavior—or
become victims of domestic violence—later in life.29 A study conducted
by the Office of Juvenile Justice and Delinquency Prevention found that
70% of adolescents who lived in families with parental conflicts reported
violent delinquency, compared to 49% of adolescents from households
without conflict.30 Another study revealed that male juveniles who
committed violent offenses were 50% more likely to have witnessed
domestic violence than were juveniles who committed non-violent
offenses.31 On the other hand, some children who witness spousal abuse
become more passive and are thus more likely to be victims of abuse
themselves.32
Congress noted that domestic violence negatively impacts
children’s development:
[E]ven children who do not directly witness spousal abuse are
affected by the climate of violence in their homes and
experience shock, fear, guilt, long lasting impairment of selfesteem, and impairment of developmental and socialization
skills . . . tendencies may be passed on from one generation to
the next . . . [and] witnessing an aggressive parent as a role
model may communicate to children that violence is an
acceptable tool for resolving marital conflict[.]33

29. Joel S. Milner et al., Childhood History of Abuse and Adult Child Abuse
Potential, 5 J. OF FAM. VIOLENCE 15 (finding that a childhood history of physical
abuse was significantly related to adult physical child abuse potential and that
more severe abuse in childhood increased abuse potential); DAVID ROBINSON &
JO-ANNE TAYLOR, THE INCIDENCE OF FAMILY VIOLENCE PERPETRATED BY FEDERAL
OFFENDERS: A FILE REVIEW STUDY (Correctional Service of Canada No. FV-03
1995) (finding that one quarter of male inmates in federal prison studies had
witnessed abuse of siblings or parents), available at http://www.cscscc.gc.ca/text/pblct/fv/fv03/toce-eng.shtml; Edelson, Children’s Witnessing
Domestic Violence, supra note 24, at 861 (finding that several studies of domestic
violence report a link between childhood victimization and criminal behavior in
adulthood).
30. TERRENCE P. THORNBURY, FACT SHEET #21: VIOLENT FAMILIES AND YOUTH
VIOLENCE (1994), available at http://www.ncjrs.gov/txtfiles/fs-9421.txt.
31. Steve Spacarelli et al., Exposure to Serious Family Violence Among
Incarcerated Boys, 10 VIOLENCE & VICTIMS 163, 171 (1995).
32. See Elaine Hilberman & Kit Munson, Sixty Battered Women, 2
VICTIMOLOGY 460, 463 (1978) (noting that girls who observed domestic violence
“were likely to become withdrawn, passive, clinging, and anxious”); Tomkins et
al., supra note 26, at 151 (“Girls may learn that victimization is inevitable and
that no one can help change this pattern.”) (internal citations omitted).
33. H.R. Rep. No. 101-737, at 3 (1990).
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3. Inability to Co-Parent. Requiring hostile parents to remain in
contact with each other can harm the parents and negate the positive
effects of co-parenting. “Domestic violence or battering is a means of
establishing control over another person through fear and intimidation.
[Battering] includes emotional, economic, and sexual abuse, and the
kind of isolation that is experienced by hostages or prisoners of
war . . .”34 A person who has abused his spouse only once may use the
fear evoked by memory of the abuse to continue to control his former
partner.35 In such situations, joint legal custody is inappropriate because
the abusive ex-spouse can still manipulate the victim ex-spouse,
effectively maintaining sole decision-making power for their child.36
Even if the abusive parent is not using fear to further control his
victim, it may be impossible to reap the benefits of co-parenting where
there is a history of violence between parents. The relationship between
the parents lacks the trust, communication, respect, and equality
necessary for making decisions together and maintaining regular
contact. A study by the State of Washington concluded that joint
physical custody in high-conflict families is detrimental to children and
does not foster better communication or cooperation between parents.37
Since allowing the perpetrator to have contact with the child creates a
risk that the perpetrator will continue to undermine the victim’s
parenting and victim’s relationship with the child, custody with the
perpetrator is not in a child’s best interest.38

II. THE POLITICAL AND HISTORICAL CONTEXT OF REBUTTABLE
PRESUMPTIONS
In 2004, Alaska passed House Bill 385, amending its child custody
statute to read:

34. Battered Women and Child Custody Litigation: Hearing on H.R. 1252, H.R.
1253 and H. Con. Res. 89 Before the Subcomm. on Intellectual Property & Judicial
Administration of the H. Comm. on the Judiciary, 102nd Cong. 22 (1992) (statement
of Rep. Constance A. Morella).
35. See id.
36. Id. at 71–73 (statement of Melanie S. Griffin, Executive Director, New
Jersey Commission on Sex Discrimination in the Statutes).
37. DIANE N. LYE, WASHINGTON STATE PARENTING ACT STUDY (1999),
http://www.courts.wa.gov/newsinfo/index.cfm (follow “Washington State
Parenting Act Study” hyperlink; then follow “Chapter 4: What the Experts Say”
hyperlink).
38. LUNDY BANCROFT & JAY G. SILVERMAN, ASSESSING RISK TO CHILDREN FROM
BATTERERS 2 (2002), available at http://new.vawnet.org/Assoc_Files_VAWnet
/RisktoChildren.pdf.
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There is a rebuttable presumption that a parent who has a
history of perpetrating domestic violence against the other
parent, a child, or a domestic living partner may not be
awarded sole legal custody, sole physical custody, joint legal
custody, or joint physical custody of a child.39
House Bill 385 is consistent with national trends. Beginning in the
1990’s, state and federal governments began to take note of the
detrimental effect joint custody assumptions might have on children.
The United States Congress passed a concurrent resolution expressing
the sense of the Congress that evidence of physical abuse creates “a
statutory presumption that it is detrimental to the child to be placed in
the custody of the abusive spouse.”40 The National Council of Juvenile
and Family Court Judges agreed; in 1994, the Council released the
Model Code on Domestic and Family Violence, which states:
In every proceeding where there is at issue a dispute as to the
custody of a child, a determination by the court that domestic
or family violence has occurred raises a rebuttable presumption
that it is detrimental to the child and not in the best interest of
the child to be placed in sole custody, joint legal custody, or
joint physical custody with the perpetrator of family violence.41
The presumption is also supported by the American Bar Association42
and the American Psychological Association.43
State legislatures have taken two approaches to incorporating
evidence of domestic violence in child custody decisions. Some states
have enacted laws requiring that a history of domestic violence be
considered when determining a child’s best interests while allowing the
judge to maintain discretion in weighing such evidence. Others,
including Alaska, have gone further, creating a rebuttable presumption
against awarding custody to a parent who has perpetrated domestic
violence in the past.

III. OPERATION OF THE ALASKA AMENDMENT
To understand the effect of House Bill 385, Alaska’s child custody
laws must be examined as a whole. Alaska law does not presume joint

39. H.B. 385, 23d Leg., 2d Sess. (Alaska 2004).
40. H.R. Con. Res. 172, 101st Cong. § 1 (1990).
41. MODEL CODE ON DOMESTIC AND FAMILY VIOLENCE § 401 (1994).
42. See A.B.A. House of Delegates, Approved Resolutions Related to
Domestic Violence (1989) (“Joint custody is inappropriate in cases in which
spouse abuse, child abuse, or parental kidnapping is likely to occur.”).
43. See A.B.A., VIOLENCE AND THE FAMILY 99 (1996).
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or sole custody; rather, the court determines custody in accordance with
the best interests of the child.44 Section 25.24.150 of the Alaska Statutes
enumerates a list of non-exhaustive factors that judges shall consider in
determining the child’s best interests:
(1) the physical, emotional, mental, religious, and social needs
of the child;
(2) the capability and desire of each parent to meet these needs;
(3) the child’s preference if the child is of sufficient age and
capacity to form a preference;
(4) the love and affection existing between the child and each
parent;
(5) the length of time the child has lived in a stable, satisfactory
environment and the desirability of maintaining continuity;
(6) the willingness and ability of each parent to facilitate and
encourage a close and continuing relationship between the
other parent and the child, except that the court may not
consider this willingness and ability if one parent shows that
the other parent has sexually assaulted or engaged in domestic
violence against the parent or a child, and that a continuing
relationship with the other parent will endanger the health or
safety of either the parent or the child;
(7) any evidence of domestic violence, child abuse, or child
neglect in the proposed custodial household or a history of
violence between the parents;
(8) evidence that substance abuse by either parent or other
members of the household directly affects the emotional or
physical well-being of the child;
(9) other factors that the court considers pertinent.45
Before House Bill 385 was enacted, judges had discretion to weigh
those factors as they saw fit. Therefore, a judge could determine that it
was not in a child’s best interests to award legal or physical custody to a
parent who had perpetrated domestic violence.46 A judge could also
determine that a history of domestic violence against a spouse did not
make a person unfit to parent, and thus award physical or legal custody
to a parent with a history of perpetrating abuse.47

44. ALASKA STAT. § 25.24.150(a) (2006).
45. ALASKA STAT. § 25.24.150(c) (2006).
46. See, e.g., Farrell v. Farrell, 819 P.2d 896 (Alaska 1991) (awarding sole
custody to mother after considering history of domestic violence perpetrated by
father).
47. See Carstens v. Carstens, 867 P.2d 805 (Alaska 1994) (upholding custody
award to father who had a history of perpetrating domestic violence where there
was no showing that the abuse affected or would affect the child).
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Since section 25.24.150 of the Alaska Statutes was amended in 2004,
few appellate cases have addressed the presumption.48 In 2005,
roundtable discussions in Bethel and Fairbanks revealed that
practitioners and domestic violence advocates were still concerned with
how House Bill 385 would operate.49 Roundtable participants in Bethel
noted that they were unsure of how the bill would be implemented;
those in Fairbanks were concerned that difficulties in deciding whether
domestic violence occurred would complicate custody proceedings and
that the presumption would “lead to a ‘run’ on [domestic violence]
courts,” stretching already limited resources.50 Despite initial concerns
over implementation, the language of the statute and operation of
presumptions in other states clarifies how House Bill 385 was intended
to operate. First, House Bill 385 is equivalent to a legislative statement
that placement with a parent who has perpetrated domestic violence is
not in a child’s best interests. Second, House Bill 385 requires that a
parent perpetrate a certain level of violence against other household
members before the presumption takes effect. Third, the presumption
against custody may be rebutted by enumerated showings.
A. Effect of Presumption
The most important aspect of section 25.24.150 of the Alaska
Statutes is that it creates a presumption against custody when one
parent has committed a certain level of violence against another parent
or other household member.51 Considering domestic violence in custody
decisions is not unique: statutes in forty-nine states and the District of
Columbia include domestic violence as a factor that courts must or may
consider in custody disputes.52 Twenty-two of those states apply a
rebuttable presumption that awarding custody to the perpetrator of
domestic violence is not in the child’s best interests.53
48. See, e.g., Van Sickle v. McGraw, 134 P.3d 338 (Alaska 2006) (holding that
section 25.24.150 of the Alaska Statutes did not apply because case had
concluded by the effective date of amendments).
49. BARBARA HOOD, ALASKA COURT SYSTEM, CHILDREN IN ALASKA’S COURTS:
REPORT ON REGIONAL RECOMMENDATIONS 58 (2005), available at http://www.
state.ak.us/courts/outreach/children.pdf.
50. Id. at 59.
51. See ALASKA STAT. § 25.24.150(g) (2006).
52. See Annette M. Gonzalez & Linda M. Rio Reichmann, Representing
Children in Civil Cases Involving Domestic Violence, 39 FAM. L.Q. 197 app. A (2005)
(listing custody statutes in all fifty states, the District of Columbia, and U.S.
territories).
53. See id. at 198 n.5 (listing the twenty-four states and territories that have a
rebuttable presumption against awarding custody to the perpetrator of domestic
violence).
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Alaska’s presumption operates such that once a court has
recognized that a parent has committed a certain level of domestic
violence against a domestic partner, that parent cannot be awarded
custody.54 The presumption does not allow the perpetrator to be
awarded sole legal custody, sole physical custody, joint legal custody, or
joint physical custody of a child.55 Some state presumption statutes
apply only to joint custody.56 For example, Idaho’s custody laws contain
a presumption that joint custody is not in a child’s best interests if one of
the parents is a habitual perpetrator of domestic violence.57 Unlike
Alaska, Idaho has a statutory presumption that joint custody is in a
minor’s best interests.58 Therefore, the Idaho presumption against joint
custody where domestic violence is present is necessary to offset a
statute that would otherwise favor it.59 The Alaska statute is stronger
than those in states like Idaho, because it is not necessary to overcome a
conflicting presumption, and it bars a perpetrator of domestic violence
from maintaining any type of custody.
Further, Alaska juries are required to apply subsections 150(h)–(i)
whenever one party presents credible evidence of domestic violence. In
Puddicombe v. Dreka,60 one of the few Alaska cases to apply section
25.24.150(g) of the Alaska Statutes, the Alaska Supreme Court held that
anytime the record shows that domestic violence has occurred, the court
must address whether it amounted to a history of perpetrating domestic
violence.61 The Puddicombe court found plain error where the trial court
recognized that both parents had perpetrated domestic violence, but the
trial court failed to consider section 25.24.150(g) of the Alaska Statutes.62
Less than a year later, the Alaska Supreme Court affirmed this holding
in Michele M. v. Richard R.63 There, Michele M. presented unrebutted
evidence that Richard R. abused his first wife.64 The superior court
awarded custody to Richard, applying the best interest factors in section

54. ALASKA STAT. § 25.24.150(g) (2006).
55. Id.
56. See, e.g., IDAHO CODE ANN. § 32-717B(5) (2008) (“There shall be a
presumption that joint custody is not in the best interests of a minor child if one
of the parents is found by the court to be a habitual perpetrator of domestic
violence as defined in section 39–6303, Idaho Code.”).
57. Id.
58. See King v. King, 50 P.3d 453, 460 (Idaho 2002).
59. Act of April 1, 1994, ch. 340, 1994 Idaho Sess. Laws 1075.
60. 167 P.3d 73 (Alaska 2007).
61. Id. at 77.
62. Id.
63. 177 P.3d 830, 837–38 (Alaska 2008).
64. Id. at 837.
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150(c).65 Although the Alaska Supreme Court acknowledged that
Richard’s behavior might not have amounted to a “history of
perpetrating domestic violence,” the court reversed and remanded the
custody decision since the superior court failed to explicitly make such a
finding.66 These cases demonstrate the strength of the rebuttable
presumption: once the issue of domestic violence is properly raised, the
court must address the question, and if it finds that domestic violence is
present, it must decide against awarding custody to the perpetrator.
An alternative approach is to consider domestic violence as one of
many factors in making custody decisions. For example, New York’s
custody statute states:
Where either party to an action concerning custody of or a right
to visitation with a child alleges . . . that the other party has
committed an act of domestic violence against the party
making the allegation or a family or household member of
either party . . . and such allegations are proven by a
preponderance of the evidence, the court must consider the effect
of such domestic violence upon the best interests of the child,
together with such other facts and circumstances as the court
deems relevant in making a direction pursuant to this section.67
The New York statute thus requires that a court consider how the
existence of domestic violence impacts the child’s best interests, but still
leaves the door open for a judge to award joint or sole custody to a
perpetrator of domestic violence. New York considered the factors that
often encourage states to adopt presumptions like section 25.24.150(g) of
the Alaska Statutes, but New York deliberately chose for the issue to be
non-determinative in custody proceedings.68
Finally, under the Alaska statute, if the court finds that both
parents have a history of perpetrating domestic violence under section
25.24.150(g), then the court has discretion to award custody to one of the
two parents or to neither parent. Under section 25.24.150(i) of the Alaska
Statutes, the court must either:

65. Id. at 833.
66. Id. at 837–38.
67. N.Y. DOM. REL. LAW § 240(1)(a) (2007) (emphasis added).
68. A.2446-c/S.7403-b, Laws of 1996, Ch. 85, § 1 (N.Y. 1996) (effective May
21) (“Rather than imposing a presumption, the legislature hereby establishes
domestic violence as a factor for the court to consider in child custody and
visitation proceedings, regardless of whether the child has witnessed or has been
a direct victim of the violence.”).
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(1) award sole legal and physical custody to the parent who is
less likely to continue to perpetrate the violence and require
that the custodial parent complete a treatment program; or
(2) if necessary to protect the welfare of the child, award sole
legal or physical custody, or both, to a suitable third person if
the person would not allow access to a violent parent except as
ordered by the court.69
Thus, when both parents are perpetrators of domestic violence, the
court must exercise some discretion to determine how likely the parents
are to continue abusive behavior. In some cases, the court must conduct
the same best interests analysis that is explicitly outside the court’s
discretion when only one parent has a history of perpetrating domestic
violence.
B.

Presumption and the Friendly Parent Provision

Absent evidence of domestic violence, one factor that Alaska judges
must consider in determining custody is “the willingness and ability of
each parent to facilitate and encourage a close and continuing
relationship between the other parent and the child . . .”70 This so-called
“friendly parent provision” is an attempt to foster the relationship a
child has with both parents. Assuming that co-parenting is in a child’s
best interests, it is also in a child’s best interests to be placed with a
parent who will be receptive to the non-custodial parent’s requests to
see the child and who will consider the other parent’s wishes when
making decisions for the child. Though the friendly parent provision is
only one of a number of factors that judges are to consider in
determining a child’s best interests, it was frequently the deciding factor
prior to enactment of House Bill 385, despite evidence that the “friendly
parent” was abusive.71 If the benefits of co-parenting outweigh the
detriments of allowing an abusive parent to have physical and legal
custody of a child, then this outcome was correct.
Alaska courts were not unique in allowing the friendly parent
provision to trump evidence of domestic violence. For example, in the

69. ALASKA STAT. § 25.24.150(i) (2006).
70. ALASKA STAT. § 25.24.150(c)(6) (2006).
71. See Transcript of Audio Cassettes of Committee Minutes on House Bill
No. 385, at 0747, 0995, 1170 (Mar. 1, 2004), http://www.legis.state.ak.us/basis/
get_single_minute.asp?session=23&beg_line=01301&end_line=0228&time=1310
&date=20040301&comm=JUD&house=H (statements of Tracy Gould, Kimberlee
Vanderhoof, Gigi Pilcher) (detailing three custody disputes where the Alaska
courts awarded custody to a male perpetrator of domestic violence because of
the friendly parent provision).
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Missouri case of Gant v. Gant,72 a mother provided unrebutted testimony
that the father physically abused her.73 However, because the mother
had moved out of the state and did not have a car to transport their
children, the court found that the father was more likely to allow
“frequent and meaningful” contact with the other parent.74 Therefore,
the court affirmed the trial court’s decision to award primary physical
custody to the abusive father.75 Similarly, in In re Marriage of Cobb,76 the
Kansas Court of Appeals affirmed amending a joint custody award to an
award of sole custody to the father, despite the mother’s allegations of
child abuse, due to the parents’ inability to co-parent.77
This precise outcome was a motivating factor behind adopting the
rebuttable presumption in Alaska.78 During public hearings on House
Bill 385, the Program Director for Careline Crisis Intervention told the
story of a woman who was killed by her abuser because she did not
obtain a protective order against him out of fear of acting out of
compliance with the friendly parent provision.79 Another speaker noted
that four women in Fairbanks alone were fatalities of the friendly parent
provision during the course of a single custody hearing.80 Because of
situations like those reported in the public hearings, Alaska courts do
not consider the friendly parent provision where one parent has a
history of perpetrating domestic violence; the presumption against

72. 923 S.W.2d 527 (Mo. Ct. App. 1996). Missouri did not have a rebuttable
presumption against awarding custody to perpetrators of domestic violence at
the time Gant was decided. Id. at 530.
73. Id. at 528–29. The husband admitted to grabbing his wife by the face and
pushing her over the couch; poking her in the eye; stating that he wanted to kill
her; fighting with other men; and smashing watches, radios, and a television. Id.
at 529.
74. Id. at 530–31.
75. Id. at 531.
76. 988 P.2d 272 (Kan. Ct. App. 1999).
77. Id. at 274–75.
78. Rep. Lesil McGuire, Sponsor Statement for H.B. 385, Mar. 15, 2004,
available at http://www.akrepublicans.org/mcguire/23/spst/mcgu_hb385.php.
(“The bill also modifies our statutes ‘friendly parent’ provision that
inadvertently harms children, particularly in circumstances involving domestic
violence, child abuse/sexual abuse and neglect.”). The American Bar
Association also notes that applying the friendly parent provision is
inappropriate where one parent has abused either the other parent or his or her
children. ABA CENTER ON CHILDREN AND THE LAW, A JUDGE’S GUIDE: MAKING
CHILD-CENTERED DECISIONS IN CUSTODY CASES 134 (2d ed. 2008), available at
http://www.abanet.org/legalservices/probono/childcustody/judges_guide.pd
f.
79. Transcript of Audio Cassettes of Committee Minutes on House Bill No.
385, supra note 71, at 0995 (statement of Kimberlee Vanderhoof, Program
Director of Careline Crisis Intervention).
80. Id. at 0747 (statement of Tracy Gould).

4--BOLOTIN__FINAL2.DOC

280

12/5/2008 3:53:15 PM

ALASKA LAW REVIEW

VOL. 25:2

custody prevents the best interests analysis of which the friendly parent
provision is a part.81 By prohibiting courts from finding that abused
parents are poor co-parents and using that finding against the abused
parent, Alaska’s custody statute may now encourage victims to report
abuse in custody proceedings.82
C.

Invoking the Presumption

The presumption in the Alaska statute is inherently limited. The
Alaska statute explicitly provides that domestic violence must rise to a
certain level before the presumption against custody is invoked. Further,
the presumption in section 25.24.150(g) only applies when violence has
been perpetrated against the abuser’s domestic living partner. Finally,
the party raising the issue of abuse must prove abuse by a
preponderance of the evidence.
1. Requirement that Level of Violence Amount to a History of
Perpetrating Violence. The first requirement for the presumption to be
raised is that one of the parents has a history of “perpetrating domestic
violence.”83 Section 25.90.010 of the Alaska Statutes provides that in Title
25, “domestic violence” has the meaning given in section 18.66.990 of the
Alaska Statutes,84 which defines “domestic violence” to include crimes
against the person, burglary, criminal trespass, arson, criminal mischief,
terrorist threats, violating a protective order, and harassment.85
Psychological and emotional abuse, absent commission of a crime or
infliction of physical harm, do not constitute domestic violence, and
therefore do not raise the presumption against custody.86 Psychological
and emotional abuse may still be considered when a judge makes his
custody determination if the abuse affects the child’s well-being, but
evidence of psychological and emotional abuse will be balanced against
other factors enumerated in section 150 to decide what custody
arrangement is in the child’s best interests.87

81. ALASKA STAT. § 25.24.150(g) (2006).
82. See infra Part IV.B. Further protecting children and victimized parents,
the Alaska Statute prohibits courts from denying custody to a parent based
solely on the fact that the victimized parent is suffering from the effects of abuse,
unless the effects are so severe they prevent the parent from safely caring for the
child. ALASKA STAT. § 25.24.150(k) (2006).
83. ALASKA STAT. § 25.24.150(g) (2006).
84. ALASKA STAT. § 25.90.010 (2006).
85. ALASKA STAT. § 18.66.990(3) (2006).
86. See id.
87. See ALASKA STAT. § 25.24.150(c) (2006).
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For the purposes of the child custody statute, a “perpetrator” of
domestic violence has either committed one incident of domestic
violence that leads to serious bodily injury or has committed multiple
incidents of domestic violence.88 Alaska, unlike many other states, does
not require multiple incidents of abuse to invoke its presumption.89
Idaho, on the other hand, requires a parent be a “habitual perpetrator”
of domestic violence before its presumption against custody arises.90
Requiring ongoing abuse is designed to protect a parent whose violent
episode is not characteristic of his ability to parent. However, labeling a
single incident of abuse as an anomaly carries dangers as well: an abuser
may be able to use just one incident of abuse to control the other parent,
effectively maintaining sole decision-making power if he is awarded
joint custody because he can still manipulate the victim.91 Therefore,
awarding joint legal custody to such a parent is not in the child’s best
interests. Further, a child can be traumatized by just one incident of
abuse if he is aware of it.92 Giving physical custody to such a parent
would not be in a child’s best interests.
2. Requirement that Victim Be a Domestic Living Partner. The
second requirement to raise the presumption is that the offenses be
perpetrated against the child, the other parent, or a “domestic living
partner.”93 “Domestic living partner” is not defined in the statute.94
However, the term at least includes married and unmarried parents
petitioning for custody.95
One possible interpretation of “domestic living partner” is that it
has the same meaning as “household member,” as defined in Alaska’s

88.
89.
90.
91.

ALASKA STAT. § 25.24.150(h) (2006).
See id.
IDAHO CODE ANN. § 32-717B(5) (2008).
Janis Wolak & David Finkelhor, Children Exposed to Partner Violence, in
PARTNER VIOLENCE: A COMPREHENSIVE REVIEW OF TWENTY YEARS OF RESEARCH 90
(Janis L. Jasinski & Linda M. Williams eds., 1998).
92. Id.
93. ALASKA STAT. § 25.24.150(g) (2006); see also ALASKA STAT. § 18.66.990(3)
(requiring that an offense be committed against a “household member” in order
to meet the definition of domestic violence); § 18.66.990(5) (defining “household
member”).
94. See ALASKA STAT. § 25.24.150 (2006).
95. See Puddicombe v. Dreka, 167 P.3d 73, 75 n.3 (Alaska 2007) (“AS
25.24.150 establishes how the court should determine custody when the parents
are divorcing. Unmarried parents may petition for custody under AS 25.20.060,
which requires the court to consider the factors enumerated in AS 25.24.150(c) . .
. .”).
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domestic violence statutes.96 There, Alaska defines “household member”
to include:
(A) adults or minors who are current or former spouses;
(B) adults or minors who live together or who have lived
together;
(C) adults or minors who are dating or who have dated;
(D) adults or minors who are engaged in or who have engaged
in a sexual relationship;
(E) adults or minors who are related to each other up to the
fourth degree of consanguinity, whether of the whole or half
blood or by adoption, computed under the rules of civil law;
(F) adults or minors who are related or formerly related by
marriage;
(G) persons who have a child of the relationship; and
(H) minor children of a person in a relationship that is
described in (A)-(G) of this paragraph.97
Assuming that “domestic living partner” has the same meaning as
“household member” may be appropriate since Alaska intended to
adopt the approach of the Model Code of the Family Violence Project of
the National Council of Juvenile and Family Court Judges.98 The Model
Code is written to raise the presumption wherever “domestic or family
violence” has occurred.99 The Model Code describes “domestic or family
violence” as occurring between “family or household member[s]”;100 the
definition of “family or household members” in the Model Code is
identical to the definition of “household members” in the Alaska
Code.101 Therefore, the only way section 25.24.150 of the Alaska Statutes
could adopt the Model Code approach would be to use the terms
“household member” and “domestic living partner” interchangeably.
On the other hand, “domestic living partner” may be more limited.
Until recently, all appellate cases that applied section 25.24.150(g) of the
Alaska Statutes concerned violence between parents of the child whose

96. See ALASKA STAT. § 18.66.990(5) (2006).
97. Id.
98. See Transcript of Audio Cassettes of Committee Minutes on House Bill
No. 385, supra note 71, at 0622 (statement of Lesil McGuire, Chair of the H.
Judiciary Standing Comm. and Sponsor of H.B. 385) (explaining that the
legislation would adopt the Model Code).
99. MODEL CODE ON DOMESTIC AND FAMILY VIOLENCE § 401 (1994).
100. Id. at § 102(1).
101. Compare ALASKA STAT. § 18.66.990(5) (2006) (defining “household
member”), with MODEL CODE ON DOMESTIC & FAMILY VIOLENCE, § 102(2) (1994)
(defining “family or household member”).
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custody was in dispute.102 However, a 2008 Alaska Supreme Court case
clarifies that a spouse who is not the parent of the child also qualifies as
a “domestic living partner.”103 In Michele M. v. Richard R., Michele M.
and Richard R. had a child, Charles, out of wedlock.104 In 2006, Richard
filed for sole legal and primary physical custody of Charles.105 At the
hearing, Michele presented unrebutted testimony from Richard’s exwife, whom he married after Charles’ birth, that Richard physically
abused her on several occasions.106 The Alaska Supreme Court held that
Richard’s record of violence against his ex-wife triggered the analysis in
sections 25.24.150(g)–(i), requiring the court to determine whether this
record amounted to a history of violence under section 150(h).107 It is
unclear from the decision whether Richard’s ex-wife qualified as a
“domestic living partner” merely because she had been married to
Richard, or because she had lived with him after Charles’ birth.
The Michele M. decision does not define the outer limits of
“domestic living partner” but may suggest that only victims who
actually lived with the perpetrator, the victim, or the child while the
child was alive are considered “domestic living partners.” Such a
definition makes sense, given that the purpose of the Alaska
presumption is to protect children from the detrimental effects of
domestic violence.108 The broader interpretation—”household
member”—would include any past casual relationships, where a history
of violence may not be indicative of a parent’s propensity to become
violent against or to manipulate members of his family.109 Moreover, a

102. See Puddicombe v. Dreka, 167 P.3d 73 (Alaska 2007) (considering
domestic violence between unmarried parents of a child whose custody was in
dispute); O’Dell v. O’Dell, No. S-12097, 2007 WL 1378153 (Alaska May 9, 2007)
(determining whether ex-husband had committed multiple acts of domestic
violence against his ex-wife in deciding custody of their son).
103. See Michele M. v. Richard R., 177 P.3d 830, 837–38 (Alaska 2008).
104. Id. at 831.
105. Id. at 832.
106. Id. at 833.
107. Id. at 837–38.
108. Transcript of Audio Cassettes of Committee Minutes on House Bill No.
385, supra note 71, at 0622 (statement of Lesil McGuire, Chair of H. Judiciary
Standing Comm. and Sponsor of H.B. 385).
109. See Transcript of Audio Cassettes of Hearing on House Bill No. 314
Before the Senate Committee on the Judiciary, at 548 (Apr. 6, 1996), available at
http://www.legis.state.ak.us/cgi-bin/folioisa.dll/cm19/query=*/doc/%7B@7
296%7D? (statement of Lauree Hugonin, member, Alaska Network on Domestic
Violence and Sexual Assault) (noting that perpetrators of domestic violence
sometimes carry weapons to mediation as an intimidation technique); Beth
Goldstein Lewis Trimmer, A Sexual Relationship, Did We Have One?, 24 ALASKA L.
REV. 237, 238–239 (2007) (explaining the potentially broad scope of “household
member” under section 18.66.990(5) of the Alaska Statutes).
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narrow interpretation is consistent with the Louisiana Post-Separation
Family Violence Relief Act,110 upon which the Alaska statute was
based.111 In 2002, a Louisiana appellate court refused to apply the
presumption against custody where the father’s abusive actions towards
the mother occurred prior to their marriage and the birth of their
child.112 Since the Alaska Legislature adopted the Louisiana language
after this decision, it may have intended to adopt the position that the
domestic violence must have somehow negatively affected the child in
order to raise the presumption. Further, the Louisiana interpretation is
consistent with all Alaska cases that have considered section 150(g) to
date.113
3. Requirement that Violence Be Proved by a Preponderance of the
Evidence. The final requirement to invoke the presumption in section
25.24.150(g) is that domestic violence be proved by a preponderance of
the evidence. Since the preponderance of the evidence standard does not
require a prior trial or conviction, domestic violence may be raised for
the first time at the custody hearing. The Alaska statute is virtually
identical to the California,114 Louisiana,115 Massachusetts,116
Minnesota,117 North Dakota,118 and Washington, D.C.119 standards in this
regard. Other states place a higher burden of proof on the parent
seeking to invoke presumptions against custody.120 For example, both

110. LA. REV. STAT. ANN. § 9:361–69 (2008).
111. Transcript of Audio Cassettes of Committee Minutes on H.B. No. 385,
supra note 71, at 0420 (statement of Allen M. Bailey, family law attorney).
112. Martin v. Martin, 833 So. 2d 1216, 1220–21 (La. Ct. App. 2002).
113. See, e.g., Puddicombe v. Dreka, 167 P.3d 73 (Alaska 2007) (considering
domestic violence between unmarried parents of a child whose custody was in
dispute); O’Dell v. O’Dell, No. S-12097, 2007 WL 1378153 (Alaska May 9, 2007)
(determining whether ex-husband had committed multiple acts of domestic
violence against his ex-wife in deciding custody of their son).
114. CAL. FAM. CODE § 3044 (West 2004) (applying a preponderance of the
evidence standard).
115. LA. REV. STAT. ANN. § 9:364 (2008) (requiring a finding of “family
violence”).
116. MASS. GEN. LAWS ch. 208, § 31A, 209 (2001) (applying a preponderance of
evidence standard); ch. 209, § 38; ch. 209C, § 10.
117. MINN. STAT. § 518.17 (2006) (requiring a “finding of domestic abuse”).
118. N.D. CENT. CODE § 14-09-06.2(1)(j) (2004) (requiring “credible evidence
[of] domestic violence”).
119. D.C. CODE §§ 16-911, 16-914 (2001) (applying a preponderance of the
evidence standard).
120. Although a presumption against custody is not invoked when there is
little evidence of domestic violence, these courts may consider the evidence of
domestic violence when determining which custody arrangement is in the
child’s best interests.
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Oklahoma121 and Nevada122 require a parent to show clear and
convincing evidence of domestic violence; South Dakota requires a
conviction of domestic abuse or assault, homicide of the other parent, or
a history of domestic abuse proved by “greater convincing force of the
evidence;”123 and Florida requires a conviction for a third-degree felony
or higher involving domestic violence.124 Because Florida law otherwise
favors shared custody,125 a parent who has been convicted of attempted
murder,126 manslaughter,127 kidnapping,128 or aggravated child abuse129
will likely be awarded joint custody. In Alaska, if these crimes are
directed against a domestic living partner, the perpetrator will not be
awarded joint or sole custody.130
Raising the presumption upon a lower standard of proof is
consistent with the standard required in other civil trials. Alaska courts
have demonstrated that a low standard does not mean a parent will be
rewarded for falsely accusing the other parent of abuse. In O’Dell v.
O’Dell,131 for example, although the husband accused his wife of
domestic violence, the superior court found that her behavior did not
rise to the level of perpetrating domestic violence and awarded custody
rights to both parents.
4. Rebutting the Presumption. The final important aspect of the
Alaska presumption is that it is rebuttable. A parent found to be a
perpetrator of domestic violence may rebut the presumption by showing
that (1) he has successfully completed an intervention program for
batterers; (2) he does not engage in substance abuse; and (3) the best
interests of the child require that parent be awarded custody because the
other parent is absent, suffers from a mental illness that affects ability to
parent, or engages in substance abuse that affects his ability to parent.132
Alternatively, he can prove that the child’s best interests require he be
awarded custody.133 Alaska’s prescribed means of rebutting the
presumption is a compromise between those states that list specific

121.
122.
123.
124.
125.
126.
127.
128.
129.
130.
131.
132.
133.

OKLA. STAT. ANN. tit. 43, § 112.2 (West 2001).
NEV. REV. STAT. § 125.480(5) (2004).
S.D. CODIFIED LAWS §§ 25-4-45.5, 25-4-45.6 (2004).
FLA. STAT. § 61.13(2)(c)(2) (2008).
Id.
FLA. STAT. § 782.051(3) (2006).
FLA. STAT. § 782.07(1) (2006).
FLA. STAT. § 787.01(2) (2006).
FLA. STAT. § 827.03(2) (2006).
See ALASKA STAT. § 18.66.990(3) (2006) (defining domestic violence).
No. S-12097, 2007 WL 1378153 (Alaska May 9, 2007).
ALASKA STAT. § 25.24.150(h).
Id.
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factors for overcoming the presumption and those that leave it up to the
judge to determine if the child’s best interests require custody with the
abusive parent.
On one end of the spectrum are states that require a perpetrator of
domestic violence to take certain steps before a judge has discretion to
look at the child’s best interests. Wisconsin’s presumption against
custody is only rebutted if the perpetrator has successfully completed a
program for batterers and the best interests of the child require custody
with the previously abusive parent.134
California is an example of a state that requires judges to consider
multiple factors in determining whether the presumption has been
rebutted. California judges must take into account:
(1) Whether the perpetrator of domestic violence has
demonstrated that giving sole or joint physical or legal custody
of a child to the perpetrator is in the best interest of the
child . . . .
(2) Whether the perpetrator has satisfactorily completed a
batterer’s treatment program . . . .
(3) Whether the perpetrator has successfully completed a
program of alcohol or drug abuse counseling if the court
determines that counseling is appropriate.
(4) Whether the perpetrator has successfully completed a
parenting class if the court determines the class to be
appropriate.
(5) Whether the perpetrator is on probation or parole, and
whether he or she has complied with the terms and conditions
of probation or parole.
(6) Whether the perpetrator is restrained by a protective order
or restraining order, and whether he or she has complied with
its terms and conditions.
(7) Whether the perpetrator of domestic violence has
committed any further acts of domestic violence.135
In California, since none of these factors is determinative, the judge
has a large amount of discretion to determine whether or not the
abusive parent may be granted custody. Even more lenient standards for
rebutting the presumption exist in states like Minnesota, where the code
provides no explanation of how the presumption may be rebutted.136

134. WIS. STAT. § 767.41(2)(d)(1) (2007).
135. CAL. FAM. CODE § 3044 (West 2008).
136. See MINN. STAT. § 518.17(2) (2008) (stating that “the court shall use a
rebuttable presumption that joint legal or physical custody is not in the best
interests of the child if domestic abuse, as defined in section 518B.01, has
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The rebuttable presumption merely shifts the burden to the abusive
parent to show that he is fit to parent, rather than placing the burden on
the victimized parent to show that the abuser is unfit. Although the
Alaska statute outlines one way to overcome the presumption,
requirements for rebuttal appear to be on the more lenient side: in an
unpublished case, the Alaska Supreme Court held that a perpetrator of
domestic violence had overcome the presumption, but did not explain
why.137

IV. THE ALASKA STATUTE SUCCESSFULLY ADDRESSES SOME
CONCERNS OVER THE EFFECTS OF PARENTING BY PERPETRATORS
OF DOMESTIC VIOLENCE
A.

Existence of a Rebuttable Presumption

The existence of a rebuttable presumption in Alaska law is
beneficial to children involved in custody disputes. First, the
presumption may encourage abused parents to leave their violent
partner. Second, the presumption ensures that courts consider the
existence of domestic violence in making custody decisions. Third, the
presumption nullifies other considerations in Alaska custody law that
disfavor an abused parent. Fourth, the presumption simplifies custody
cases by treating divorcing perpetrators of domestic violence like
perpetrators who remain married.
First, section 25.24.150(g) of the Alaska Statutes may encourage a
parent to leave an abusive relationship. As the United States Congress
noted, “[a]bused spouses . . . often have difficulty in separating from
their abuser because of the tremendous insecurity that such abuse
fosters and a lack of financial resources to leave the family home.
Moreover, many women fear that if they seek a divorce, they will lose
custody of their children.”138 Victims of domestic violence often make
decisions to stay with or leave the perpetrator based on their sense of the
best interests of their children.139 Therefore, if a victim of domestic
violence believes she will lose access to her children, it is unlikely that

occurred between the parents,” but failing to explain how the presumption may
be rebutted).
137. O'Dell v. O’Dell, No. S-12097, 2007 WL 1378153, at *5 (Alaska May 9,
2007).
138. 136 CONG. REC. H8282 (1990).
139. EDLESON ET AL., supra note 16, at 15.
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she will leave the abusive relationship.140 By removing this fear, the
presumption encourages the victimized parent to leave, ending a
situation that is detrimental to the child.141
Second, the presumption in section 25.24.150(g) of the Alaska
Statutes ensures that courts give adequate weight to the existence of
domestic violence in determining the child’s best interests. Though
Alaska courts were required to consider domestic violence prior to the
2004 amendments, abusive fathers still won custody cases up to 70% of
the time.142 At least one study shows that allegations of domestic
violence have no demonstrated effect on the rate at which fathers obtain
custody of their children.143 Another shows that female victims of
domestic violence are actually less likely to be awarded sole legal
custody of their children than are non-victims.144 Given the impact that
domestic violence has on a child’s development, these figures suggest
that courts emphasized other factors in making custody decisions.
Section 25.24.150(g) of the Alaska Statutes may remedy this problem by
requiring courts to address domestic violence when it is credibly
raised.145 In fact, one study of rebuttable presumptions in fifteen states
revealed that the presumption does have a palpable effect on custody
awards: the victimized mother obtained sole custody at a rate of fiftytwo percent in states with a rebuttable presumption.146 In contrast, in
states without a rebuttable presumption, victimized mothers obtained
sole custody only thirty-one percent of the time.147

140. Transcript of Audio Cassettes of Committee Minutes on House Bill No.
385, supra note 71, at 2049 (statement of Christine McLeod Pate, Mentoring
Attorney, Alaska Network on Domestic Violence and Sexual Assault).
141. See Julie Kunce Field & Karen Gulberg Cook, “But He Never Hit the Kids”:
Domestic Violence as Family Abuse, 73 MICH. BAR J. 922, 922 (1994) (arguing that
domestic violence against a spouse is child abuse).
142. Transcript of Audio Cassettes of Committee Minutes on House Bill No.
385, supra note 71, at 0179 (statement of Lesil McGuire, Chair of H. Judiciary
Standing Comm. and Sponsor of H.B. 385).
143. Kernic et al., supra note 20, at 1006, 1014 (finding that mothers who were
victims of a history of domestic violence were no more likely to be awarded
custody than mothers who were not victims).
144. Nancy E. Johnson et al., Child Custody Mediation in Cases of Domestic
Violence: Empirical Evidence of a Failure to Protect, 11 VIOLENCE AGAINST WOMEN
1022, 1035 (2005).
145. See Puddicombe v. Dreka, 167 P.3d 73, 77 (Alaska 2007) (finding plain
error where the trial court does not make findings as to a history of perpetuating
domestic violence when the record shows that domestic violence has occurred).
146. Allison C. Morrill et al., Child Custody and Visitation Decisions When the
Father Has Perpetrated Violence Against the Mother, 11 VIOLENCE AGAINST WOMEN
1076, 1093 (2005).
147. Id.
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While the presumption in section 25.24.150(g) of the Alaska
Statutes may not be necessary in all cases for a court to appropriately
consider domestic violence in child custody disputes,148 it is the best way
to ensure that domestic violence is always appropriately considered. In
many custody cases, the judges, child custody investigators, and
guardians ad litem that effectively decide the custody question have
little to no training in domestic violence.149 As the legislative history of
House Bill 385 reveals, the child custody investigators charged with
making expert recommendations on a child’s best interests are not
required to have any training in domestic violence or sexual abuse.150
Lack of familiarity with domestic violence may be worse in rural areas
where the magistrate’s legal experience is limited.151 Many studies assert
that the judicial and social workers involved in custody cases tend to
dismiss charges of spousal abuse or consider spousal abuse irrelevant to
child custody.152 Carstens v. Carstens,153 wherein the Alaska Supreme
Court confirmed a custody award to the allegedly violent parent,
provides a good example.154 There, “the trial judge made specific
findings that there was no showing that the alleged abuse affected or
would affect” the child.155 Since the trial court actually considered the
history of abuse, the appellate court would not reverse its determination
that placement with the abusive parent was in the best interests of the
child.156 Other inappropriate outcomes in custody proceedings where
domestic violence was a factor were cited in a public hearing on House
Bill 385, indicating just how widespread the problem was before section
25.24.150(g) of the Alaska Statutes was adopted.157

148. See, e.g., Farrell v. Farrell, 819 P.2d 896, 899 (Alaska 1991) (reasoning that
since joint legal custody is appropriate only when parents can cooperate and
communicate in the child’s best interests, joint legal custody was inappropriate).
149. Transcript of Audio Cassettes of Committee Minutes on House Bill No.
385, supra note 71, at 1947 (statement of Christine McLeod Pate, Mentoring
Attorney, Alaska Network on Domestic Violence and Sexual Assault).
150. Id.
151. Id. at tape 04-31, side A, No. 1491 (statement of Dennis L. McCarty,
Attorney at Law).
152. See Naomi R. Cahn, Civil Images of Battered Women: The Impact of Domestic
Violence on Child Custody Decisions, 44 VAND. L. REV. 1041, 1072 (1991) (citing
studies in Nevada, Maryland, and Florida).
153. 867 P.2d 805 (Alaska 1994).
154. Id. at 808.
155. Id.
156. Id.
157. Transcript of Audio Cassettes of Committee Minutes on House Bill No.
385, supra note 71, at 0747, 0995, 1170 (statements of Tracy Gould, Kimberlee
Vanderhoof, Gigi Pilcher).
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Third, even where courts do recognize that domestic violence is
significant to a child’s best interests, abusers may still have an advantage
in custody disputes where domestic violence is merely a factor in
custody determinations. Batterers may present themselves well in court
because of the characteristics that are common among abusive spouses:
confidence, ability to manipulate, and denial of abusive behavior.
Frequently, the key witness for a previously abusive father is his new
partner; her testimony that the father is not violent implies that his past
abuse related directly to his interactions with the mother, effectively
shifting blame to her.158 In contrast to domestic violence perpetrators,
victims may appear weak in court. Not only will a victim be afraid to
confront her abuser in court,159 but she may suffer from psychological
effects such as post-traumatic disorder,160 anxiety,161 depression,162 and
suicidality.163 Victims are often noted as “irrational, over-emotional,
spiteful, and vindictive.”164
Further, the presumption takes on extra significance in a state like
Alaska where child custody laws contain a friendly parent provision.

158. See PETER G. JAFFE ET AL., CHILD CUSTODY
FOR SAFETY AND ACCOUNTABILITY 32 (2002).

& DOMESTIC VIOLENCE: A CALL

159. See Demie Kurz, Separation, Divorce, and Woman Abuse, 2 VIOLENCE
AGAINST WOMEN 63, 72 (1996) (finding that fear following separation from an
abusive spouse may prevent women from fighting for their rights in custody
proceedings).
160. See Jacqueline M. Golding, Intimate Partner Violence as a Risk Factor for
Mental Disorders: A Meta-Analysis, 14 J. FAM. VIOLENCE 99, 116–17 (1999)
(comparing eleven studies of women who experienced intimate partner violence
to find that the mean prevalence of post-traumatic stress disorder among
battered women was 63.8 percent, compared to 1.3–12.3% in the general
population); Millie C. Astin et al., Posttraumatic Stress Disorder and Childhood
Abuse in Battered Women: Comparisons with Maritally Distressed Women, 63 J.
CONSULTING AND CLINICAL PSYCHOL. 308, 310 (1995) (finding that battered
women exhibited significantly higher rates of post-traumatic stress disorder than
maritally distressed women—58% compared to 18.9%).
161. See Mary N. Russell et al., Psychological Profiles of Violent and Nonviolent
Maritally Distressed Couples, 26 PSYCHOTHERAPY 81, 82 (1989).
162. See LENORE E. WALKER, THE BATTERED WOMAN SYNDROME 111 (2d ed.
1999); GOLDING, supra note 160, at 106 (comparing eighteen studies of women
who experienced intimate partner violence to find that the mean prevalence of
depression among battered women was 47.6%, compared to somewhere
between 10.2%–21.3% in the general population of women).
163. See Golding, supra note 160, at 112–13 (comparing thirteen studies of
women who experienced intimate partner violence to find that the mean
prevalence of suicidality among battered women was 17.9%, compared to 6.6%
in the general population of women). “Suicidality” includes thoughts of
attempts at suicide. Id. at 112.
164. Transcript of Audio Cassettes of Committee Minutes on House Bill No.
385, supra note 71, at 1947 (statement of Christine McLeod Pate, Mentoring
Attorney, Alaska Network on Domestic Violence and Sexual Assault).
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Absent the presumption in section 25.24.150(g) of the Alaska Statutes,
Alaska courts often favored the parent who was most likely to foster a
friendly relationship under section 25.24.150(c)(6) of the Alaska Statutes:
abusive parents were awarded custody where the victimized parent was
unwilling to cooperate with the other parent—her former abuser.165
Merely raising the issue that the other parent is unfit could count against
the victimized parent.166 Similarly, minimizing contact with the abuser—
a natural reaction for a victim of domestic violence—may count against
the victimized parent.167 The result is that friendly parent provisions
“reinforce learned helplessness in the victimized parent by encouraging
her to suppress her complaints for fear that she will lose custody if she
flees, denies her abuser visitation, or complains about his abusiveness in
court.”168 Even more striking is that the friendly parent provision is
more commonly applied against the mother—the parent more likely to
be the victim of abuse—than the father.169 However, House Bill 385
amended section 25.24.150(c)(6) of the Alaska Statutes so that domestic
violence effectively trumps the friendly parent provision:
Once the trial court makes an evidence-based finding that
domestic violence occurred, however, it should explicitly
address whether or not the parent is a continuing threat to the
health and safety of the other parent of the children prior to
relying on the parent’s willingness to foster a relationship
under AS 25.24.150(c)(6).170
Therefore, Alaska’s rebuttable presumption is necessary to nullify
the friendly parent provision—a custody consideration that would
otherwise favor custody with the abusive parent.
165. Id. at 0179 (statement of Lesil McGuire, Chair of the House Judiciary
Standing Committee) (“‘Friendly parent’ statutes are often used by abusive
parents against the protective parent.”); see, e.g., Van Sickle v. McGraw, 134 P.3d
338, 341 (Alaska 2006) (affirming award of custody to father, who perpetrated
domestic violence, because he was better at achieving an “open and loving
frequent relationship” with the other parent).
166. See Transcript of Audio Cassettes of Committee Minutes on House Bill
No. 385, supra note 71, at 0995 (statement of Kimberlee Vanderhoof, Program
Director, Careline Crisis Intervention) (telling the story of domestic violence
victim who was admonished by the court for disputing custody with her
abuser).
167. See ABA CENTER ON CHILDREN AND THE LAW, supra note 78, at 134
(“Domestic violence victims, often for the safety of their children and
themselves, take active steps to minimize contact and relationships with the
abuser.”).
168. Joan Zorza, Friendly Parent Provisions in Custody Determinations, 26
CLEARINGHOUSE REV. 924, 925 (1992).
169. Id. at 924.
170. Puddicombe v. Dreka, 167 P.3d 73, 77 (Alaska 2007).

4--BOLOTIN__FINAL2.DOC

292

12/5/2008 3:53:15 PM

ALASKA LAW REVIEW

VOL. 25:2

Fourth, a presumption against a perpetrator of domestic violence is
consistent with the treatment of abusive parents in households where
custody is not at issue. The Alaska child welfare agency is authorized to
remove a perpetrator of domestic violence from the household and to
prevent removal of the child from the non-offending parent.171
It is important to note that a rebuttable presumption may not be as
necessary in Alaska as it is in states that presume joint custody is in a
child’s best interests. For example, section 518.17(2) of the Minnesota
Statutes provides that joint custody is presumed to be in the best
interests of a child.172 Absent a presumption overriding section
518.17(2)(d) of the Minnesota statutes, a parent with a history of
perpetrating domestic violence must be given joint custody if he so
requests it.173 The presumption in Minnesota is therefore indispensable
to ensuring a child’s best interests, because even a judge’s discretion
could not prevent placement with the abusive parent. Further, if a judge
in a state that presumes joint custody is in a child’s best interests does
not believe a parent’s allegations of domestic violence, he must award
joint custody.174 Therefore, in states like Minnesota, it is crucial that the
level of proof and abuse required to invoke the presumption be low.
B.

Ease of Invoking the Presumption

Requiring only a preponderance of the evidence to invoke the
presumption against custody benefits the victimized parent and the
child. Higher standards—for instance, requiring a criminal conviction—
would not serve Alaska’s policy goal of protecting children and
victimized parents from their abusers. It is highly likely that a custody
trial will be the first time that victimized parents raise the issue of abuse:
while they are still living with abusive partners, victims of domestic
violence may believe that reporting the violence to police or filing for a
protective order will only encourage retaliation.175 Moreover, a
documented, substantiated history of domestic violence surfaces in
fewer than twenty-five percent of the cases where a police report or
protection order exists.176 Since Alaska courts must apply the
presumption against custody based on a preponderance of the evidence,

171. ALASKA STAT. § 47.17.035 (2006).
172. MINN. STAT. § 518.17(2)(d) (2006).
173. Id.
174. Id.
175. Rita Smith & Pamela Coukos, Fairness and Accuracy in Evaluations of
Domestic Violence and Child Abuse in Custody Determinations, 36 JUDGES J. 38, 39
(1997).
176. Kernic et al., supra note 20, at 1005.
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the victimized parent and child are not disadvantaged if they have failed
to institute an action against the abusive parent in the past or if the
victimized parent fails to present evidence of such an action at the
custody hearing.
Proponents of higher standards of proof—like those in Florida and
Nevada177—take the position that a parent accused of perpetrating
domestic violence may have used violence as a way of protecting
himself.178 Thus, the presumption against the victim of domestic
violence is detrimental to the child because it discourages a victimparent from leaving an abusive relationship if she used violence to
defend herself or her children in the past.179 Further, if the level of abuse
required to invoke the presumption is low, then a judge may apply the
presumption against the victimized parent and award custody to the
abusive parent.180 Finally, supporters contend that finding a
presumption against custody with minimal evidence is inconsistent with
the strength of a parent’s interest in his relationship with his child.181
These arguments are unfounded. First, courts can and do consider
which parent is the dominant aggressor, largely eliminating the
possibility that the presumption will be invoked against a victimized

177. See FLA. STAT. § 61.13(2)(c)(2) (2006) (requiring “[e]vidence that a parent
has been convicted of a felony of the third degree or higher involving domestic
violence” in order to invoke a rebuttable presumption against “shared parental
responsibility” with the perpetrator); NEV. REV. STAT. § 125C.230(1) (2007)
(requiring the court to conduct an evidentiary hearing and find clear and
convincing evidence of domestic violence to invoke the presumption against
custody).
178. See Nancy Ver Steegh & Clare Dalton, Report from the Wingspread
Conference on Domestic Violence and Family Courts, 46 FAM. CT. R. 454, 457 (2008)
(proposing that applying rebuttable presumptions against custody for a single
incidence of violence would be inappropriate where the perpetrator is, in fact, a
victim of domestic violence).
179. See Cheryl Terrance et al., Maternal Blame: Battered Women and Abused
Children, 14 VIOLENCE AGAINST WOMEN 870, 873 (2008) (“Women may also
remain [in abusive relationships] because of fear of losing custody or not being
believed.”).
180. See Ver Steegh & Dalton, supra note 176 at 457; Castle v. Simmons, 86
P.3d 1042, 1045 (Nev. 2004) (“[B]y requiring the court . . . to conduct a hearing
and to find by clear and convincing evidence that domestic violence occurred,
the Legislature has protected innocent parents from unfounded allegations.”).
181. See, e.g., UNIFORM PARENTAL RIGHTS ENFORCEMENT AND PROTECTION ACT
§§ 102(c), 103, 109(2) (recommending laws that create unalienable parental rights
which can only be abridged due to abuse proved beyond a reasonable doubt),
available at http://www.childrensjustice.org/uprepa.htm; see also Joan S. Meier,
Domestic Violence, Child Custody, and Child Protection: Understanding Judicial
Resistance and Imagining Solutions, 11 J. GENDER, SOCIAL POLICY, & LAW 657, 710–
12 (discussing judicial reluctance to terminate a parent’s relationships with his
children, despite evidence of that parent’s abuse).
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parent. Second, a high burden of proof is not necessary to protect a
parent’s right to a relationship with his child, since it is highly unlikely
that a parent will fabricate allegations of abuse to obtain custody.
First, the potential for invoking the presumption against a
victimized parent who is merely protecting herself is easily mitigated by
a “dominant aggressor” clause, a requirement that the court determine
which parent instigated the domestic violence. Such clauses are common
in state penal codes that direct police officers to ascertain which party is
primarily responsible for an incident of domestic violence and to arrest
that party only.182 Some state custody statutes, including the Alaska
statute, contain a dominant aggressor clause or a similar
consideration.183 For example, Delaware’s custody statutes require that,
if both parents have a history of perpetrating domestic violence, courts
must consider whether one parent was the dominant aggressor when
making a custody determination.184 However, the statute does not
prohibit the court from placing children with the dominant aggressor.185
Similarly, the Alaska custody statutes include a clause which requires

182. See, e.g., ALA. CODE § 13A-6-134 (2005); ARK. CODE ANN. § 16-81-113(a)(1)
(2005); CAL. PENAL CODE § 13701(b) (West 2000); FLA. STAT. § 741.29(4)(b) (2006);
GA. CODE ANN. § 17-4-20.1(b) (2008); IOWA CODE § 236.12(3) (2008); LA. REV. STAT.
ANN. § 46:2140(1) (1999); MD. CODE ANN., CRIM. PROC. § 2-204(b) (West 2001); MO.
REV. STAT. § 455.085(3) (2003); MONT. CODE ANN. § 46-6-311(2)(b) (2007); NEB. REV.
STAT. § 29-439(1) (2007); NEV. REV. STAT. § 171.137(2) (2007); N.H. REV. STAT. ANN.
§ 173-B:10(II) (2001); N.Y. CRIM. PROC. LAW § 140.10(4)(c) (McKinney 2004); N.D.
CENT. CODE § 14-07.1-10(2) (2004); OKLA. STAT. tit. 22 § 60.16(B) (2003); R.I. GEN.
LAWS § 12-29-3(c)(2) (2002); S.C. CODE ANN. § 16-25-70(D) (2003); S.D. CODIFIED
LAWS § 25-10-35 (2004); TENN. CODE ANN. § 36-3-619(b) (2005); UTAH CODE ANN. §
77-36-2.2(3) (2003); VA. CODE ANN. § 19.2-81.3(B) (2004); WASH. REV. CODE §
10.31.100(2)(c) (2002); WIS. STAT. § 968.075(2)(1)(c)(am) (2007); but see OHIO REV.
CODE ANN. § 2935.03(B)(3)(b) (West 2006) (explicitly providing that an officer
may arrest any family member in violation of domestic violence statute even if
he was not the primary aggressor).
183. See, e.g., ALASKA STAT. § 25.24.150(i)(1) (2006); DEL CODE ANN. tit. 13 §
705A (2008) (requiring courts to consider whether one parent was the primary
aggressor in making custody determinations if both parents have a history of
perpetrating domestic violence); LA. REV. STAT. ANN. 9:364(B) (2000) (“If the
court finds that both parents have a history of perpetrating family violence,
custody shall be awarded solely to the parent who is less likely to continue to
perpetrate family violence.”); NEV. REV. STAT. § 125.480(6) (2006) (requiring
courts to determine who the dominant aggressor is and to apply the
presumption against custody to that parent only; listing factors to consider in
determining the dominant aggressor); WIS. STAT. §§ 767.41(2)(d)(b)(2)–(4); Krank
v. Krank, 529 N.W.2d 844, 848 n.2 (N.D. 1995) (excluding conduct that is part of
battered spouse syndrome from domestic violence); see generally State v. Marr,
765 A.2d 645, 651 n.1 (Md. 2001) (discussing various states’ interpretations of
whether conduct amounts to self defense or domestic violence).
184. DEL CODE ANN. tit. 13 § 705A (2008).
185. Id.
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courts to place children with the parent who is “less likely to continue to
perpetrate the violence” if both parents have a history of perpetrating
domestic violence.186 Though Alaska’s custody statute is not equivalent
to a dominant aggressor clause, it can easily be applied to require courts
to determine who the dominant aggressor is: if one parent is merely
reacting to violence perpetrated by the other, she is clearly less likely to
continue the violent behavior than the parent who is instigating the
abuse.187
Second, requiring a high standard of proof of abuse is unnecessary
to alleviate fears that one parent will falsely accuse another of domestic
violence in custody disputes.188 One study found that only 1.3% of
female-initiated allegations of abuse against the father were
intentionally false.189 Further, parents in the midst of custody disputes
are no more likely to make false accusations of abuse than are members
of the general population.190 A National Center on Child Abuse and
Neglect study of 9000 custody disputes where sexual abuse was alleged
“found no evidence to support the belief that these cases typically
involved mothers falsely accusing fathers to gain or maintain custody of
the children.”191 This study also reported that allegations of abuse were
more likely to be valid in families with older children, most likely
because the child can provide a check on a parent who might otherwise

186. ALASKA STAT. § 25.24.150(i)(1) (2006).
187. See FOURTH BATTERED MOTHERS CUSTODY CONFERENCE, TESTIMONY TO THE
TRUTH COMMISSION 7 (2007), http://stopfamilyviolence.org/media/Truth%20
Commission%20Final%2007.pdf (listing reasons that explain why the dominant
abuser is responsible for violence).
188. See generally RICHARD A. GARDNER, PARENTAL ALIENATION SYNDROME: A
GUIDE FOR MENTAL HEALTH AND LEGAL PROFESSIONALS (2d ed. 1998) (blaming one
parent—usually a woman—for vilifying the other parent, frequently in the
context of custody disputes; arguing that allegations of abuse are a symptom of
a psychological problem called Parental Alienation Syndrome and should not be
taken seriously in most cases). The American Psychological Association has
noted that no data support the existence of Parental Alienation Syndrome. Press
Release, Am. Psychological Ass’n, Statement on Parental Alienation Syndrome
(Oct. 28, 2005), available at http://www.apa.org/releases/ passyndrome.html.
189. Nicholas Bala & John Schuman, Allegations of Sexual Abuse when Parents
Have Separated, 17 CAN. FAM. LAW Q. 191, 196 (2000).
190. Thea Brown et al., Revealing the Existence of Child Abuse in the Context of
Marital Breakdown and Custody and Access Disputes, 24 CHILD ABUSE & NEGLECT
849, 852 (2000) (finding that false child abuse allegations occurred no more
frequently in custody proceedings than in other circumstances).
191. Nancy Thoennes & Patricia G. Tjaden, The Extent, Nature, and Validity of
Sexual Abuse Allegations in Custody/Visitation Disputes, 14 CHILD ABUSE & NEGLECT
151, 161 (1990). In fact, fathers are far more likely to make intentionally false
accusations of abuse than mothers are. Nico Trocme & Nicholas Bala, False
Allegations of Abuse and Neglect when Parents Separate, 29 CHILD ABUSE & NEGLECT
1333, 1341 (2005).

4--BOLOTIN__FINAL2.DOC

296

12/5/2008 3:53:15 PM

ALASKA LAW REVIEW

VOL. 25:2

make a false accusation of abuse.192 Since false allegations of abuse are so
infrequent and since falsity can be easily verified by simple testimony
from a child, a low burden for producing evidence of domestic violence
is sufficient for invoking presumptions against custody.
C.

Effect of Presumption on Visitation Benefits Children

Allowing a domestic violence perpetrator to have only supervised
visitation with a child protects the child’s best interests. Growing up in a
household where domestic violence is present may have devastating
effects on a child’s psychological and emotional development and may
also result in physical harm to the child.193 Limiting physical access to
the child prevents further harm and may also allow the child to heal.
First, continuing contact with a perpetrator of domestic violence
may cause ongoing harm to a child. Bancroft and Silverman drew on
their clinical experience to enumerate a number of those risks: (1) risk of
continued undermining of the mother’s parenting and the mother-child
relationship; (2) risk of continued exposure to authoritarian or neglectful
parenting; (3) risk of exposure to new threats of violence, psychological
maltreatment, or direct victimization by the batterer; (4) risk of learning
violence-supportive beliefs and attitudes; (5) risk of being abducted or
otherwise used as a tool of the perpetrator; and (6) risk of the child’s
exposure to violence in the father’s subsequent relationship with other
women.194 Since the purpose of Alaska’s statutory presumption is to
protect children, limiting contact is desirable.
Second, keeping a child away from a batterer may reduce the
harmful effects of living in an abusive family. Children appear to exhibit
fewer problems as time elapses from their last exposure to a violent
event.195 Therefore, ensuring that children are not re-exposed to violence
is beneficial to them.

V. IMPROVING THE ALASKA CUSTODY STATUTES
Although the existence of a rebuttable presumption is preferable to
a more general “best interests of the child” standard, the Alaska Statutes
would benefit from further clarifications and expansions. First, a child

192. Thoennes & Tjaden, supra note 191, at 161.
193. See supra Part I.B.2.
194. BANCROFT & SILVERMAN, supra note 38, at 2–4.
195. Jeffrey L. Edleson et al., How Children are Involved in Adult Domestic
Violence: Results from a Four City Telephone Survey, 18 J. INTERPERSONAL VIOLENCE
18, 27–28 (2003) (finding that children in secure environments are less likely to
intervene in domestic violence between adults).
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whose parent has perpetrated domestic violence should be able to raise
the presumption. Second, the Alaska Legislature should clarify the term
“domestic living partner.” Third, judges should not have such wide
discretion to allow for unsupervised visitation with a parent who has
perpetrated domestic violence.
A. Allow the Child to Raise the Presumption
Alaska should allow a child who is the subject of a custody
proceeding to present evidence of domestic violence in order to raise the
presumption in section 25.24.150(g) of the Alaska Statutes. Alaska courts
already consider a child’s preference, if he is old enough to state one,
when making custody decisions.196 However, if a parent does not raise
the issue of domestic violence and ask for the rebuttable presumption,
the presumption may be waived in a custody hearing.197 For example, in
Thomas v. Thomas,198 a victimized mother presented uncontroverted
evidence of her ex-husband’s history of domestic violence at trial.199
Since the mother did not ask to raise the presumption in section
25.24.150(g) of the Alaska Statutes, the court was merely required to
weigh evidence of the abuse under section 25.24.150(c) of the Alaska
Statutes’ best interests analysis.200
Similarly, in Ginn-Williams v.
Williams,201 the Alaska Supreme Court held that where neither party had
brought up domestic violence until after entering a final and binding
agreement, the court could not address the issue on appeal.202
Thomas and Ginn-Williams are not merely anecdotal: a 2005 study
conducted in Washington revealed that in 246 families where police
incident reports or court orders indicated a preexisting history of maleperpetrated domestic violence, domestic violence was mentioned in
fewer than 53% of custody hearings.203 This study and others

196. ALASKA STAT. § 25.24.150(c)(3) (2006).
197. See, e.g., Ginn-Williams v. Williams, 143 P.3d 949, 951–52 (Alaska 2006)
(holding that raising concerns over domestic violence is not permissible where
parties had not brought up domestic violence before reaching a final and
binding custody agreement).
198. 171. P.3d 98 (Alaska 2007).
199. Id. at 106.
200. Id. at 106 n.26.
201. 143 P.3d 949 (Alaska 2006).
202. Id. at 952–53.
203. Mary A. Kernic et. al., Children in the Crossfire: Child Custody
Determinations Among Couples with a History of Intimate Partner Violence, 11
VIOLENCE AGAINST WOMEN 991, 1005 (2005).
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demonstrate that mothers frequently fail to report abuse to the courts
even where substantial proof of abuse exists.204
This outcome is inconsistent with the purpose of section
25.24.150(g) of the Alaska Statutes: the parents’ failure to raise domestic
violence should not waive a child’s interest in being placed in a safe and
stable household. The problem is somewhat mitigated in Alaska since
children may be issued protective orders against an abusive parent.205
Still, a “lack of evidence . . . along with the shame and denial that often
accompanies [domestic violence]” means that abusive parents often win
custody cases.206 Allowing a child to present evidence of domestic
violence creates one more potential source of evidence, further
protecting the integrity of the judicial process.
Allowing a child to raise the issue of domestic violence is consistent
with Alaska law and the law in other states. Alaska law provides that a
guardian ad litem may be appointed in civil cases where the child is not
the actual petitioner.207 Further, a third party may initiate a suit for a
protective order against a parent on behalf of the child.208 These
provisions do not apply to custody hearings; custody, however, may be
decided during hearings for protective orders.209 Given that children
and their representatives may actually initiate or participate in
proceedings that may affect custody, allowing children to have a role in
hearings that will certainly affect custody makes sense.
B.

Clarify the Meaning of “Domestic Living Partner”

By stating that the presumption in section 25.24.150(g) of the
Alaska Statutes is raised whenever domestic violence is committed
against a “domestic living partner,” the Alaska Statutes add a layer of

204. See Jeffrey L. Edleson, The Overlap Between Child Maltreatment and Women
Battering, 5 VIOLENCE AGAINST WOMEN 134 (1999) (reviewing studies that show
inconsistencies in reports of domestic violence to courts, counties, and shelters).
205. See ALASKA STAT. § 18.66.100(a) (2006) (providing that a parent, guardian,
or other representative may file a petition on a minor’s behalf for a protective
order against a household member when the minor has been a victim of
domestic violence). The Alaska statute does not allow the minor to file a petition
for a protective order if he has not been a “victim” of domestic violence, though
the statute does not define the word “victim” to require that abuse be directed at
the minor. Id.
206. Transcript of Audio Cassettes of Committee Minutes on House Bill No.
385, supra note 71, at 1947 (statement of Christine McLeod Pate, Mentoring
Attorney, Alaska Network on Domestic Violence and Sexual Assault).
207. ALASKA STAT. § 18.66.100(a) (2006).
208. Id.
209. ALASKA STAT. § 18.66.100(c)(9) (2006).
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confusion to an already difficult issue for the courts.210 “Domestic living
partner” is not defined in the Alaska Statutes, nor has the Alaska
Supreme Court clarified what the term means.211 Both a broad and a
narrow interpretation are consistent with the legislative history.212 This
ambiguity may interfere with the purpose of the presumption in section
25.24.150(g) of the Alaska Statutes.
If a court applies a narrow interpretation of the statute and uses the
presumption only when an abusive parent directed violence against a
person with whom a child had contact, then the court overlooks the risk
that the parent will abuse the child. Since studies demonstrate that
parents who abuse partners are more likely to abuse their children, this
danger is grave.213 Moreover, the narrow interpretation of “domestic
living partner” ignores that an abusive parent could use his past history
of violence to scare the other parent, even when violence was never
directed at that parent. In such a situation, co-parenting would be
detrimental to the child.
If a court applies a broad interpretation of the statute and uses the
presumption when a parent has been violent toward a former partner,
then it may lose sight entirely of the purpose of section 25.24.150(g) of
the Alaska Statutes. Under the broader interpretation of “domestic
living partner,” whether a parent has perpetrated domestic violence
may become the central issue of a custody hearing. Since judges may not
be well-equipped to consider the importance of domestic violence, this
outcome would be exactly what section 25.24.150(g) of the Alaska
Statutes attempted to avoid.
The Alaska Legislature or the Alaska courts must either clarify the
meaning of “domestic living partner” or risk that custody disputes
devolve into a trial on all past parental conduct, regardless of its
relevance to the child’s best interests.
C.

Limit Judicial Discretion to Allow Unsupervised Visitation with a
Perpetrator of Domestic Violence

That a judge may allow unsupervised visitation if an abusive
parent fulfills certain requirements somewhat diminishes the benefit of
the presumption against custody.214 As a Louisiana case noted, the
210. See supra Part III.C.2.
211. See supra Part III.C.2.
212. See supra Part III.C.2.
213. See EDLESON ET AL., supra note 16, at 9.
214. See ALASKA STAT. § 25.24.150(j) (2006) (“[C]ourt may allow unsupervised
visitation if . . . the violent parent has completed a substance abuse treatment
program if the court considers it appropriate, is not abusing alcohol or
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purpose of prohibiting contact between an abusive parent and his child
until the court finds that the parent has successfully completed a
treatment program is to “remove even the possibility of further abuse of
the child at the hands of the parent due to perceived failures of existing
laws.”215 Unless a judge finds that the perpetrator of domestic violence
no longer poses a danger to the child, both Alaska and Louisiana law
prohibit even supervised visitation between an abusive parent and a
child until the parent has completed a program for perpetrators of
domestic violence.216 If a judge finds that an abusive parent is no longer
a threat, he is authorized to allow unsupervised visitation.217 However,
the Legislature does not define how a judge should determine whether
the perpetrator poses a danger to the child; nor does it delineate factors
for determining whether a child’s best interests requires unsupervised
visitation.218
Though section 25.24.150(j) of the Alaska Statutes requires that an
abusive parent make some showing that he should be allowed to have
unsupervised visitation,219 giving a judge discretion to allow
unsupervised visitation ignores the main purpose for creating a
rebuttable presumption: judges may still place too little emphasis on the
likelihood of future harm to the child and the abused parent. Assessing
the ongoing risks to children from households with domestic violence is
complex. Bancroft and Silverman outlined nine factors that should be
considered in assessing the risks described above, including attention to:
(1) the perpetrator’s history of physical or sexual abuse and neglect of
his children, (2) the level of continued danger to the non-abusive parent,
(3) a history of abuse of the children and other parent, (4) a history of
using children in or exposing them to violent events, (5) the level of
coercive control that the perpetrator has exercised in the past, (6) the
degree to which the perpetrator feels entitled to access and other family
privileges, (7) a history of substance abuse and mental illness, (8) a
willingness to accept the decisions of the victim and of social institutions
such as law enforcement and the courts, and (9) the risk of child
abduction.220 Given that judges are not necessarily trained to understand

psychoactive drugs, does not pose a danger of mental or physical harm to the
child, and unsupervised visitation is in the child’s best interests.”).
215. State in re A.C., 643 So.2d 719, 731 (La. 1994).
216. See ALASKA STAT. § 25.24.150(j) (2006); LA. REV. STAT. ANN. § 9:364(B)
(2000).
217. ALASKA STAT. § 25.24.150(j) (2006).
218. See id.
219. Id.
220. BANCROFT & SILVERMAN, supra note 38, at 2–4.
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or even to be aware of these factors,221 allowing them such discretion to
provide for unsupervised visitation is inappropriate.

CONCLUSION
House Bill 385 intended to serve the best interests of the child by
presuming that custody with a perpetrator of domestic violence is not in
a child’s best interests. The existence of a rebuttable presumption is
beneficial to children and victims of domestic violence. Further, the
effect that the presumption has on an abusive parent’s contact with the
child may not only protect the child from further harm, but also help the
child recover from the detrimental effects of living in a household where
domestic violence was present. However, the Alaska Statutes could be
strengthened with greater opportunity for children to raise the
presumption, clarification of key terms, and less judicial discretion in
undoing the effect of the presumption.

221. See supra notes 149–56 and accompanying text.

